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THE FAMILY-HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION CLAUSE IN AUTO
LIABILITY INSURANCE
Automobile liability insurance policies frequently contain clauses
excluding coverage where liability arises out of suits between members
of the same family and household. These exclusionary provisions pro-
tect the insurer in situations where natural partiality exists between
a plaintiff and a defendant who are related and live together.' This
type of clause is usually upheld.2
In the recent Alabama case of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Hanna,3 the insured, a college student visiting his family for the week-
end, injured his father in an automobile accident which occurred in
the yard of the parent's home. The question involved was whether
there was coverage in light of a clause excluding recovery for "Bodily
injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured re-
siding in the same household as the insured." 4 The insured was twenty
years old and attending Howard College in Birmingham, Alabama.
His parents, who were paying part of his college expenses, lived in
East Tallassee, Alabama. The insured went home for vacations and
on occasional weekends. While he did not pay rent or board, he con-
tributed some groceries when home during the summer. He kept
some of his belongings, including the insurance policy, at home. He
used the East Tallassee address to obtain his driver's license, auto-
mobile license tags, and to register for the draft.5
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed a trial court decision
that the family-household exclusionary provision did not relieve State
Farm of its obligation to defend the insured and to pay any judgment
"Basically it is the same policy reason as behind judicial and legislative dis-
couragement of claims between members of the same family. 7 Appleman, In-
surance Law and Practice § 4411 (1962).
"The clause has been held valid as against the contentions that it is contrary
to public policy and that it violates financial responsibility laws. Zipperer v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 853 (5 th Cir. 1958). Statutes may, however, pro-
hibit the exclusion. Klatt v. Zera, ii Wis. 2d 415, 105 N.W.2d 776 (196o); Perlick
v. County Mut. Cas. Co., 274 Wis. 558, 8o N.W.2d 921 (1957).
3s66 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1964).
'Id. at 874.
'When the State Farm agent explained the conditions of the policy, includ-
ing the family-household exclusion provision, to the insured and his father, he
considered the insured to be a member of the household in East Tallassee, not-
withstanding the fact that he was in college elsewhere and would have the auto-
mobile with him. Id. at 875.
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that might be entered.6 The court rejected the insurer's contention
that the exclusionary provision was plain, unambiguous, and suscep-
tible of only one reasonable construction,t holding instead that the
insured could be residing at college while still having a legal domi-
cile with his family.
8
Generally, courts look to the purpose of the exclusionary clause,9
which is said to be the exclusion of liability where there would be
natural partiality between the insured and the injured party because
of the close ties existing between members of the same family or
domestic circle living in the same household.10 The words "family"
and "household" have been used interchangeably,"1 although "fam-
ily" may be limited to those members of a group having some blood
relationship,' 2 and "household" may be a broader term including ser-
vants or attendants.' 3 When the purpose of the exclusion is kept in
6The lower court also found that there had been no breach of the coopera-
tion clause in the policy that would prejudice the insurer. The Supreme Court of
Alabama affirmed the trial court's holding on this issue.
7The court also rejected the argument that Holloway v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 275 Ala. 41, 151 So. 2d 774 (1963), and Home Ins. Co. v. Pettit, 225
Ala. 487, 143 So. 839 (1932), were decisive of the issue in this case. The court stated
that the Holloway case was limited to the construction of the word "family"
and that the Pettit case was limited to the construction of the word "household"
in the exclusionary clause, whereas the issue in the principal case was the con-
struction of the phrase "residing in the same household."
'he court defined residence as "a dwelling place for the time being, as dis-
tinguished from a mere temporary locality of existence," and indicating "some
intent of permanency of occupation as distinguished from boarding or lodging."
The court added, however, that residence does not require "the intent of per-
manency to the degree required in domicile." In support of its conclusion that the
insured was residing at Howard College for purposes of the exclusionary provision
of the insurance policy, the court cited the requirement that a student must be "in
residence" at a college or university for the academic year preceding the award of his
degree and the general usages of the term "in residence" with regard to faculty and
students. The court also suggested that his residence might change when the student
went home during the summer.
OState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., v. James, 8o F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1936); Zipperer
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 853 (5 th Cir. 1958); Johnson v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 252 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1958); Holloway v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 275 Ala. 41, 151 So. 2d 774 (1963); Home Ins. Co. v. Pettit, 225
Ala. 487, 143 So. 839 (1932); Morris v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App.
844, 78 S.E.2d 354 (1953); Umbarger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 Iowa
203, 254 N.W. 87 (1934); Third Nat'1 Bank v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334
S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 196o); Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d
855 (1953); Engebretson v. Austvold, 199 Minn. 399, 271 N.W. 8o9 (1937); Cartier
v. Cartier, 84 N.H. 526, 153 Ad. 6 (1931); Hunter v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 446, 129 &E.2d 59 (1962).
1 Cartier v. Cartier, 84 N.H. 526, 153 Ad. 6 (1931).
"Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 252 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1958).
S12 ee Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953).
13Engebretson v. Austvold, 199 Minn. 399, 271 N.W. 809 (1937)-
CASE COMMENTS
mind, however, a discussion of the definition of these words can de-
velop into a useless exercise in semantics.' 4 Attempting to define the
words by citing definitions used in other areas of the law is not per-
suasive when one is looking to the purpose of the exclusion in the in-
surance policy.' 5 Even within the area of insurance law, definitions
used out of context may be inapplicable; for example, one may be a
member of a household within a clause extending coverage, but not
for purposes of excluding coverage.16
Generally, two questions have been raised in interpreting the
family-household exclusionary clauses: (i) Who are "members of the
family of the insured" within the meaning of the clause? (2) Who are
"residing in the same household as the insured" within the meaning
of the clause?
An argument was rejected in Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich,'7
that the clause' 8 should be construed to cover only the spouse and
issue of the insured. In this case, which actually involved adult broth-
ers,19 the court pointed out that such a narrow construction of the
"'Third Nat'l Bank v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 S.V.2d 261, 263 (Ky.
ig6o).
"See Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953); also
Holloway v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 275 Ala. 41, 151 So. 2d 774 (1963).11
See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 12o n.1 (1956).
' 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.V.2d 855 (1953). The court stated: "If the narrow
definition urged by plaintiff were applied, it would mean that if a father were
the insured his son would be within the exclusionary clause but if a son were the
insured an injured mother or father would not be within the exclusion. The same
hazard exists that the son, being the insured, would be partial to his father as
that the father, being the insured, would be partial to his son." 58 N.W.2d at 861.
The opinion in this case and the annotation at 5o A.L.R.2d 120 (1953) con-
tain detailed discussions of the family-household exclusionary provisions. For ad-
ditional supplemental material, see 12 Couch, Insurance § 45:509-531 (2d ed. 1964).
SThe exclusion covered "any member of the family of the insured residing in
the same household as the insured."
'MThe plaintiff, the defendant, and two other unmarried brothers lived with
their parents. The father owned the house; the mother prepared the meals which
they all ate together. The members of the family had the same mailing address,
and except for having separate bedrooms they commonly shared the use of the
house. While there was no set arrangement for room, board and laundry, both the
plaintiff and the defendant paid the parents.
In Holloway v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 275 Ala. 41, 151 So. 2d 774
(19 6 3) a case involving similar facts and the same exclusion, the Supreme Court
of Alabama expressly followed Tomlyanovich. The issue was whether adult sis-
ters were members of the same "family."
But see American Indem. Co. v. Martin, 54 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932),
where an adult, younger brother lived with the insured and had all the privileges
of the insured's home but had a job, paid for his room and board, and was not
in any way under the control of the insured. The court refused to hold as a mat-
ter of law that the younger brother was within a clause excluding coverage for
19651
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clause would virtually eliminate the exclusion altogether in states
which prohibit suits for personal injuries between spouses and between
unemancipated minors and their parents. While it is possible to limit
the definition of the word "family" to those members of a group hav-
ing some blood relationship, it appears that such a limitation will not
necessarily be imposed if the purpose of the exclusion is considered. 20
In Hunter v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.21 "family" was said
to include "such persons as habitually reside under one roof and form
one domestic circle;"'22 therefore, marriage was not a prerequisite to
finding that a man and woman were of the same "family" for this
insurance purpose.23
More frequently, courts have had to determine who was residing
in the same "household" as the insured. Two of the leading cases in-
terpret household exclusionary clauses, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. James24 and Cartier v. Cartier,25 arose prior to the time when
the "family" requirement was made a part of the clause.26 These two
"injury to or death of any member of the household or family of the assured
hereunder."
As to the effect of payment of board by the adult child to the parent, see
Zipperer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1958), and Morris
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354 (1953), which
held that such payment does not remove the child from the exclusion.
"See Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855 (1953).
But see Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Onali, 125 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1942), which
held that the word "relative" used in an exclusionary clause, although seemingly
a broader term than "family," is actually restricted to "one allied by blood," and
that a sister-in-law is not a "relative" within the meaning of such a clause in an
automobile indemnity policy. Contra, Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Jackson, 297 F.2d
230 (4th Cir. 1961), held that a mother-in-law was a "relative" when the purpose
of the exception was considered.
2241 S.C. 446, 129 S.E.2d 59 (1962). Coverage was excluded for "bodily injury
to or death of the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing
in the same household."
2129 S.E.2d at 61.
"In this case, a woman lived adulterously with the insured, as his wife, for
about six years and had several children by him. The insured had a living wife
from whom he had been separated, but not divorced, for a period of from twelve to
thirteen years, and who also had children by him.
28o F.2d 8o2 (4th Cir. 1936).
284 N.H. 526, 153 AUt. 6 (1931).
0In the James case, the claimant was first a boarder in the insured's home;
but after losing her job, she continued to eat and sleep there about half of her
time. She did not pay the insured, but helped with the housework. At the time of
the accident, she was staying at the insured's home. The court said: "The term
'household' is customarily used to mean a number of persons who dwell together
as a family." 8o F.2d at 8o3. Notwithstanding this definition, the court held that
the phrase was not limited to persons related by blood or marriage. In looking to
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cases have often been cited by courts in emphasizing the necessity
of looking at the purpose of the exclusion in determining its appli-
cability to a particular set of facts. 27 Cartier held that the insured does
not have to be head of the household for the household exclusion to
be applicable. 28 A later case held that the exclusion was applicable
when there was no evidence showing who was the common head or
manager of the household.29
While it would seem to be a rather anomalous position, related
people who live under a common roof have been held not to be cov-
ered by the family-household exclusion. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Pennington,30 a nephew and uncle were held not to be members
the purpose of the exclusion, the appellate court held that on the facts of this case
a motion for directed verdict should have been granted by the trial court.
In the Cartier case, the plaintiff and defendant were brothers living with
their father, mother, and sister in a house owned and managed by the mother.
The father and brothers paid board. The court stated that "household" and
"family" were substantially synonymous terms.
2"tn the often quoted words of the court in Cartier, "The natural tendency
of one insured to strengthen or enlarge the evidence of liability to members of his
household for accidents insured against increases the hazard of liability under the
policy in such cases over that for accidents to others. Without actual dishonesty,
the disposition to favor those close to one reflects itself in opinions and judg-
ments, and one insured is more likely to concede by admissions or nonresistance
blame for hurting a member of his household than for doing harm to others."
Cartier v. Cartier, 89 N.H. 526, 527; 153 Ad. 6, 7 (1931)-
OThe position the insured occupies in the household is not important. "It is
an attitude of common mutuality arising out of the general status and not one de-
pendent upon the particular relationship of one member to another within the
status. Cartier v. Cartier, supra note 27, 153 Ad. at 7. In interpreting the clause,
the court said: "[T]he reasonable conclusion would be that it was meant to cover
family accidents generally and not an arbitrary part of them limited to such as
were caused by household heads." 153 At. at 8. The court concluded that if such
a restrictive meaning were intended, more restrictive and specific language could
have been used and that the phrasing was well adapted to cover the broad purpose
of the clause notwithstanding the demands of preciseness in written contracts.
2J'ohnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1958). (The
facts are discussed infra note 39). The argument was made that where there was
no common head or manager of a household, the court was precluded from find-
ing that a person was within the exclusion which provided that coverage did not
apply "to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the
same household as the insured." The appellate court pointed out that the lower
court only found that it did not appear who was the common head or manager of
the household. It further stated, "The term 'family' or 'household' cannot be so
limited and strait-jacketed as always to mean, regardless of the facts and circum-
stances, a collective body of persons who live in one house under one common head
or "manager." Id. at 161.
3'215 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Ark. 1963). Coverage under the policy was not ex-
tended to "bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the in-
sured residing in the same household as the insured."
1965]
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of the same "family" within the meaning of an exclusionary clause
even though they lived under the same roof and were perhaps mem-
bers of the same "household."31 The court could not find from the
evidence any particular familial closeness sufficient to invoke the op-
eration of the exclusion.32 Another approach, reaching the same re-
sult, is to conclude that the insured and the claimant, although mem-
bers of the same "family," belong to two different "households" liv-
ing under the same roof. In Hoff v. Hoff,3 3 the plaintiff was a daughter-
in-law living under the same roof as the insured. The court conclud-
ed that because of the domestic arrangements and method of living a
jury could conclude that they lived in two separate households.3 4
A different result was reached by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
in Third Nat'l Bank v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.3 5 The insured,
who was a self-supporting, divorced mother, had returned to live with
her parents in a seven-room house. The insured's brother and sister-
in-law also lived in the house. The sister-in-law was found to be within
the exclusion notwithstanding the fact that she and her husband paid
rent, had separate bedrooms, and bought their own groceries.3 6
The principal case raises the question of whether members of the
same family living at different places may be "residing in the same
aThe nephew, his wife, and child had gone to live with his father because
of economic stress. Following the uncle's divorce, he had come to live with his
brother-in-law, the insured nephew's father. The father supported both his son
and his brother-in-law.
But see, Home Ins. Co. v. Pettit, 225 Ala. 487, 143 So. 839 (1932), where the
Supreme Court of Alabama, looking to the purpose of the exclusion, concluded that
an uncle and nephew were members of the same "household."
'he court stated that regardless of the specific words chosen to define family,
"any accurate definition in present context must embrace the concept of a group
of related individuals, dwelling together, and welded by familial ties into a single
sociological unit." 215 F. Supp. at 789.
S132 Pa. Super. 431, 1 A.2d 506 (1938). The policy excepted coverage to agents
and members of the insured's family. The policy also had this definition: "mem-
ber of the assured's family shall be defined as any person residing in the same
household with the assured and related to him by blood or marriage and shall also
include regardless of their place of residence those related to the assured as fol-
lows: husband, wife, father, mother, son, daughter, brother or sister."
"The plaintiff, her husband and child lived in a house owned by her father-
in-law, the insured. The plaintiff and her husband furnished and controlled the
rooms they occupied but shared a bathroom with the father-in-law. They purchased
groceries and prepared meals separately using the same kitchen but separate uten-
sils. The plaintiff did most of the housework in the entire house as payment of
rent. The family life of the plaintiff and her husband functioned separate and apart
from the defendant and his wife. Guests of the plaintiff's family were entertained
as they would have been if she and her husband had lived under a separate roof.
s334 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. i96o).
31Id. at 262.
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household." The question has arisen in cases where a member of the
family has returned to live with the family. In Johnson v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,37 a plaintiff daughter was considered to have been
"but temporarily absent from the [family] group..."3 when she
went to live with her husband for six or seven months prior to his
military transfer overseas and subsequently returned to live with her
father, who was the insured, and her uncle. She was thought never
to have had a home other than her parental home. In looking at the
intention of the parties, the court defined "family" as "such persons
as habitually reside under one roof and form one domestic circle."
3 9
The intention of the claimant, however, is clearly not controlling. In
Engebretson v. Austvold,40 the return of a married daughter to the
parental home following the death of her husband made her a member
of the same household as her mother, as a matter of law, notwithstand-
ing the daughter's testimony to the contrary regarding her intention.41
The Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected the argument that the
policy limitation which controlled the decision should be narrowly
construed, concluding that the language and purpose of the exclusion
were equally plain. In Senn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,42 the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that adult brothers were "residing
in the same household" when at the time of the accident the insured
was home on furlough from military service.4 3 The court said: "We
'252 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1958). The clause excluded coverage "to the insured or
any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the in-
sured."
"Id. at 162.
lId. at 161. The insured father lived with his brother who owned the home.
His daughter, the plaintiff, had lived with them since early childhood except for
the six or seven months she had lived with her husband. After the husband's
transfer overseas she returned to live with them.
"019g Minn. 399, 271 N.W. 8o9 (1937). The exclusionary clause included "per-
sons in the same household as the assured [defendant]...."
"The insured had testified that she did not intend to make the home of her
parents the place of her own "residence" or to "become a member of the house-
hold." She insisted that she intended to return to Montana where she had lived
with her husband. In settling her husband's estate, however, she had given Minne-
sota as her residence. In applying for a Minnesota driver's license, she had stated
under oath that she intended to remain in Minnesota permanently. While attend-
ing the University of Minnesota, she had stated that she was a resident of Minne-
sota. As to the relationship in the family group, the court could find no distinction
between the returning daughter and two other daughters who had remained at
home.
4287 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1956). The exclusion covered "any member of the family
of the insured residing in the same household of the insured."
"Prior to military service, the insured had lived with his parents and after
discharge, he continued to live there. The plaintiff brother also lived with his par-
1965]
104 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
think the facts show that Elmer [the insured] was only temporarily
absent from the family group. His absence was never accompanied
by an intent to change permanently his residence or his home, and he
returned immediately to the household upon the cessation of his mil-
itary duties."4
4
Like the principal case, other cases require the parties to be living
under a common roof for the family-household exclusion to be opera-
tive. In Kelso v. Kelso,45 adult unmarried brothers, who had lived in
the parental home all of their lives, were held not to be "residing in
the same household" when it appeared that several weeks prior to his
injury the plaintiff brother had moved to a trailer house on a farm
where he worked, 46 even though when he entered the hospital he gave
his address as that of his parents, and both he and his brother had
signed statements for the insurance adjuster to the effect that they
were members of the same household.47 The same result was reached
In Travelers Indem. Co. v. American Indem. Co s48 when the son was
killed while he was actually moving back to live with his parents. 4 9
It is submitted that a more logical and just result is reached by
looking to the purpose of the exclusion. It would seem that a college
student and his father on the facts in the principal case would fall
within the family-household exclusion if the purpose of the exclu-
sionary clause is considered.
WILUIAm DYER ANDERSON
ents. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky sustained the granting of a motion for
summary judgment.
"Id. at 44o.
"3o6 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1957).
"Actually, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was staying temporarily
at a deer hunting camp. While he was there, he visited his parents, but did not
"stay" with them.
"In discussing the meaning of the words "home," "household," and "reside,"
the court felt that since the brothers had lived at the farm substantially all of their
lives, they considered it as "home" sentimentally, and even the brother who had
left felt that he was still a part of the family group. Recitals of the kind made to
the insurance adjuster were thought not to particularly challenge the brother's at-
tention, and hence were general admissions and not as persuasive as the corroborat-
ing testimony of two of the plaintiff's witnesses who testified that the plaintiff was
living in a trailer.
'8315 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). The insurance policy did not cover
"any automobile owned by the named insured or a member of his household...."
"The son was thirty-four years old and had lived with his parents intermit-
tently following his divorce. Because of his job, he had moved to a hotel approxi-
mately fifty miles from his parent's home about three months before his death,
but returned on occasional weekends. At the time of his death, the son was mov-
ing his belongings home in his father's truck.
